IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Warum verstoßen vorwiegend die großen EWU-Länder gegen den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt?: Eine theoretische Beweisaufnahme

Listed author(s):
  • Bodo Herzog

The Stability and Growth Pact - who does not know it? The need for reforming the Stability and Growth Pact became more and more obvious in the year 2002. The big countries as Germany and France are in systematic breach of the rules within the Stability and Growth Pact. They are likely to do so again in 2004. Moreover, when the President of the European Commission calls the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact "stupid" and "rigid" it is clear that changes to the Pact are in the air. So we can conclude that everybody in Europe knows something goes wrong with the current fiscal framework and especially with the Stability and Growth Pact because Ecofin is unlikely to vote in favour of imposing sanctions. Since these events, there is a huge reform discussion about reforming the Stability and Growth Pact. But the theoretical fundament of the main arguments in the reform discussion is pretty vague. In this article I will identify the key issues and relevant trade-offs that are essential for designing appropriate fiscal policy rules at the EMU and national level. Now it is time to overcome the clearly pre-embryonic state and to look for an appropriate fiscal framework, which cures the main problems and drawbacks, particularly the current rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. Spätestens seit dem Scheitern der Frühwarnung im Februar 2002 und dem Aussetzen des Defizitverfahrens gegenüber Deutschland auf der Sitzung des Ecofin-Rates im November 2003 erlangte der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt öffentliches Aufsehen. Die Frage, warum gerade die großen Länder wie Deutschland und Frankreich gegen die 3 %-Defizithürde verstoßen, wirft so manches Rätsel auf, auch wenn Deutschland nicht alleine in der Riege der Defizitsünder ist. Hinzu kamen in jüngster Zeitauch Äußerungen, die in der politischen Arena für Wirbel und Furore sorgten. So sagte der Kommissionspräsident der Europäischen Union, Romano Prodi, in der Zeitung Le Monde: "Der Pakt ist dumm - wie alle Regeln, die rigide sind". Seitdem ist klar: Eine Reform des Stabilitätspaktes liegt in der Luft. Die Reformdiskussion, die heftig und kontrovers geführt wird, ist mittlerweile selbst für Insider kaum noch zu überschauen. Darüber hinaus gibt es bis heute keine vernünftige ökonomische Theorie, die die Defizit- und Schuldengrenzwerte erklären könnte. Diese Tatsache führt unweigerlich zu dem Problem, dass vielen Argumenten in der Reformdiskussion ein theoretisches Fundament fehlt. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden deshalb ein Überblick über die theoretischen Erklärungsansätze für den Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt gegeben sowie deren Reformansätze diskutiert. Im Zentrum stehen dabei folgende Fragen: 1. Was ist eine optimale Regel für einen heterogenen Währungsraum? 2. Warum verstoßen bislang vorwiegend große Länder gegen den Stabilitätspakt?

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.

Volume (Year): 73 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 405-417

in new window

Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-7
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Mohrenstraße 58, D-10117 Berlin

Phone: xx49-30-89789-0
Fax: xx49-30-89789-200
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
  2. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-571, October.
  3. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 1999. "Does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 299-325, December.
  4. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447.
  5. Bodo HERZOG, "undated". "European Monetary Union and Fiscal Policy Sustainability," EcoMod2004 330600067, EcoMod.
  6. Marco Buti & Gabriele Giudice, 2002. "Maastricht's Fiscal Rules at Ten: An Assessment," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(5), pages 823-848, December.
  7. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  8. Jakob de Haan & Helge Berger & David-Jan Jansen, 2003. "The End of the Stability and Growth Pact?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1093, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Ohr, Renate & Schmidt, André, 2003. "Der Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt im Zielkonflikt zwischen fiskalischer Flexibilität und Glaubwürdigkeit: Ein Reformansatz unter Berücksichtigung konstitutionen- und institutionenökonomischer Aspekte," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 19, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  10. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003. "On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union," Staff Report 330, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  11. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
  12. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 2003. "Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-15, March.
  13. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May.
  14. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Discussion Paper 2002-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bibliothek)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.