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Handelbare Verschuldungsrechte zur Sicherung fiskalischer Stabilität in der Währungsunion?

  • Renate Ohr

    ()

    (University of Goettingen)

  • André Schmidt

    ()

    (University of Goettingen)

Der europäische Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt zählt zu den zentralen Pfeilern der Europäischen Währungsunion. Die Erfahrungen der letzten Jahre zeigen jedoch, dass seine disziplinierende Wirkung zur Begrenzung übermäßiger Defizite in Zweifel zu ziehen ist. Auf der Basis des von Ronald Coase geforderten Denkens in „institutionellen Alternativen“ wird im folgenden Papier die Einführung handelbarer Verschuldungsrechte in der Europäischen Währungsunion diskutiert. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass handelbare Verschuldungsrechte sowohl aus politökonomischer als auch aus allokationstheoretischer Sicht dem bisherigen Regelungen des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes überlegen sind und eine höhere Anreizkompatibilität zur Verhinderung übermäßiger Defizite garantieren. The Stability and Growth Pact is one of the constituent pillars of the European Monetary Union. Though, meanwhile it is obvious that it will not be able to limit fiscal deficits of the member states. For this reason in this paper Coase’s thinking in institutional alternatives is applied to find a better way to increase the incentives for more fiscal stability. We present and discuss tradable deficit permits comprising market-orientated incentives for fiscal stability. It is shown that tradable deficit permits are superior from a politico-economical view as well as with regard to allocative efficiency.

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Paper provided by University of Goettingen, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Discussion Papers with number 128.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:got:vwldps:128
Contact details of provider: Postal: Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3 - D-37073 Göttingen
Web page: http://www.economics.uni-goettingen.de

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