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A Reform Proposal for EMU Institutions

  • Lossani, Marco
  • Natale, Piergiovanna
  • Tirelli, Patrizio

In this paper, we discuss a reform proposal for EMU macroeconomic institutions which rests on the generalised adoption of targets, for both monetary and fiscal policies, to be integrated by a system of checks and balances. The new arrangements for fiscal policies should induce EMU countries to internalise the external effects of their own policies, therefore allowing a partial relaxation of the SGP limits to national debt policies. As for monetary policy, we propose the adoption of an inflation target, the assignment of ex-post assessing powers to the Euro12-group and an internal reform of the ECB. The latter should limit undue nationalistic influences within the ECB governing bodies.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 18694.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18694
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  1. Grüner, Hans Peter, 1999. "On the Role of Conflicting National Interests in the ECB Council," CEPR Discussion Papers 2192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Jürgen von Hagen & Susanne Mundschenk, 2002. "The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination," Chapters, in: EMU and Economic Policy in Europe, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  3. Alessandra Casella, 1999. "Tradable deficit permits:efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 14(29), pages 321-362, October.
  4. Garry J. Schinasi & Alessandro Prati, 1997. "European Monetary Union and International Capital Markets; Structural Implications and Risks," IMF Working Papers 97/62, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 9-110.
  6. Casella, Alessandra, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Lossani Marco & Natale Piergiovanna & Tirelli Patrizio, 1999. "Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 243-270.
  8. Robert F. Graboyes, 1990. "A Yankee recipe for a Eurofed omelet," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jul, pages 18-19.
  9. André Sapir & Marco Buti, 1998. "Economic policy in EMU," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8078, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Scholarly Articles 3612769, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Casella, Alessandra, 2001. "Market mechanisms for policy decisions: Tools for the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 995-1006, May.
  13. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October.
  14. Issing, Otmar, 1997. "Monetary targeting in Germany: The stability of monetary policy and of the monetary system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 67-79, June.
  15. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
  16. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  17. Marco Catenaro & Patrizio Tirelli, 2000. "Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets ?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0002, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  18. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  19. Michael Woodford, 1995. "Price Level Determinacy Without Control of a Monetary Aggregate," NBER Working Papers 5204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
  21. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March.
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