Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets ?
We reconsider the merits of fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union distinguishing between and inflation targeting regime and delegation to a weight conservative central bank. We argue that a contractualist approach a la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.
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