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Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions

Listed author(s):
  • Casella, A.

This paper questions the link between the establishment of a common currency among several countries and the necessity of political coordination. It begins by discussing why conducting a single monetary policy is thought to be easier within a single political unit. It then proceeds to enquire whether market mechanisms could be used to choose optimally the common policy of heterogenous actors, and thus provide an alternative to political decision-making.

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Paper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 00a02.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:00a02
Contact details of provider: Postal:
G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.

Phone: 04.91.14.07.70
Fax: 04.91.90.02.27
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
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  1. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-780, October.
  2. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1995. "The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from the G-7 Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 1219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Richard Portes & Helene Rey, 2000. "The determinants of cross-border equity flows," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20203, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
  5. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  6. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
  7. Svensson, Lars, 1999. "Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem," Seminar Papers 667, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  8. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06.
  10. Gerald A. Carlino & Robert H. DeFina, 1998. "Monetary policy and the U.S. and regions: some implications for European Monetary Union," Working Papers 98-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  11. Martin Feldstein, 1997. "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 23-42, Fall.
  12. Hayo, Bernd & Uhlenbrock, Birgit, 1999. "Industry effects of monetary policy in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 14-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
  13. Joe Ganley & Chris Salmon, 1997. "The Industrial Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks: Some Stylised Facts," Bank of England working papers 68, Bank of England.
  14. Hal R. Varian, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed}," Microeconomics 9401003, EconWPA.
  15. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February.
  16. Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1999. "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 651, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  17. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  18. Widgrén, Mika, 1999. "Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 2207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1999. "Money growth targeting by the Bundesbank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 681-701, June.
  20. Theodore Groves & John O. Ledyard, 1976. "Some Limitations of Demand Revealing Processes," Discussion Papers 219, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Favero, Carlo A. & Flabbi, Luca & Giavazzi, Francesco, 1999. "The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Banks' Balance Sheets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
  23. Rudiger Dornbusch & Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "The Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 6369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, 1997. "The role of banks in monetary policy: a survey with implications for the European Monetary Union," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 2-18.
  25. Rudi Dornbusch & Carlo Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 15-64, 04.
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