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Strong Goal Independence and Inflation Targets

  • Baltensperger, Ernst
  • Fischer, Andreas M
  • Jordan, Thomas J.

Inflation targeting has become the monetary policy framework of the nineties. At the other extreme, several central banks have recently adopted key elements of the inflation targeter's toolkit, but at the same time they have made formal declarations that they are not inflation targeters. Such a position may appear surprising. It indirectly suggests that a reneging strategy is beneficial for some. The paper considers reasons why it may be advantageous for some central banks to distinguish themselves from the inflation targeting strategy. Most importantly, we argue that explicit inflation targets can potentially undermine the goal independence of a central bank.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5915.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5915
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