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Strong goal independence and inflation targets

  • Baltensperger, Ernst
  • Fischer, Andreas M.
  • Jordan, Thomas J.

Inflation targeting has become the monetary policy framework of the nineties. At the other extreme, several central banks have recently adopted key elements of the inflation targeter's toolkit, but at the same time they have made formal declarations that they are not inflation targeters. Such a position may appear surprising. It indirectly suggests that a reneging strategy is beneficial for some. The paper considers reasons why it may be advantageous for some central banks to distinguish themselves from the inflation targeting strategy. Most importantly, we argue that explicit inflation targets can potentially undermine the goal independence of a central bank.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 88-105

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:88-105
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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  7. Paul R. Krugman, 1998. "It's Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(2), pages 137-206.
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