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How Are Inflation Targets Set?

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  • Roman Horvath
  • Jakub Mateju

Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding on how inflation targets are set. For this reason, we first gather evidence from official central bank and government publications and from a questionnaire sent to central banks on how inflation targets are set; we then estimate the determinants of the level of inflation target in 19 inflation targeting countries using unbalanced panel interval regressions (to deal with the issue that targets are typically set as a range rather than as a point). Inflation targets are found to reflect macroeconomic fundamentals. Higher level as well as higher variability of inflation are associated with higher target. The setting of the inflation target is also found to have an important international dimension, as higher world inflation is positively correlated with inflation targets. Rapidly growing countries exhibit higher inflation targets. Our results also suggest that the larger width of inflation target is set in a more volatile macroeconomic environment. We find that central bank credibility is negatively associated with the level of inflation target, suggesting that less credible central banks are likely to recognize the risks related to anchoring inflation expectations at low levels. On the other hand, government party orientation does not matter even in less independent central banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Roman Horvath & Jakub Mateju, 2010. "How Are Inflation Targets Set?," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp426, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp426
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, 2013. "Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability: A Perspective from the Developing World," Working Papers Series 324, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    2. Oxana Babecka Kucharcukova & Alexis Derviz & Vaclav Hausenblas & Michal Hlavacek & Mark Joy & Narcisa Kadlcakova & Lubos Komarek & Zlatuse Komarkova & Tomas Konecny & Ivana Kubicova & Jitka Lesanovska, 2014. "Macroprudential Research: Selected Issues," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, Research Department, edition 2, volume 12, number rb12/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Borek Vasicek.
    3. Robert Ambrisko & Vitezslav Augusta & Jan Babecky & Michal Franta & Dana Hajkova & Petr Kral & Jan Libich & Pavla Netusilova & Milan Rikovsky & Jakub Rysanek & Pavel Soukup & Petr Stehlik & Vilem Vale, 2013. "Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, Research Department, edition 2, volume 11, number rb11/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Kamil Galuscak.
    4. Tiwari, Aviral Kumar & Mutascu, Mihai & Andries, Alin Marius, 2013. "Decomposing time-frequency relationship between producer price and consumer price indices in Romania through wavelet analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 151-159.
    5. Kamil Galuscak & Adam Gersl & Marcela Gronychova & Petr Hlavac & Petr Jakubik & Lubos Komarek & Zlatuse Komarkova & Tomas Konecny & Jakub Seidler, 2014. "Stress-Testing Analyses of the Czech Financial System," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, Research Department, edition 1, volume 12, number rb12/1 edited by Jan Babecky & Roman Horvath.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inflation targeting; central bank; inflation; credibility; independence;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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