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No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries

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  • Siklos, Pierre L.

Abstract

A new international data set covering over 100 countries for the period 1990-2004 is used to investigate the relationship between central bank independence (CBI) and inflation. CBI is a combination of de jure and de facto characteristics. No single mix of characteristics uniquely defines CBI. Consequently, no single definition of CBI is 'right' for all countries. The distribution of inflation around the world is concentrated in the tails. Hence, quantile regressions are estimated to investigate the role of CBI. We do find strong evidence that several core elements of what can be defined as CBI do reduce inflation.

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  • Siklos, Pierre L., 2008. "No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 802-816, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:4:p:802-816
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael D. Bordo & Pierre L. Siklos, 2015. "Central Bank Credibility: An Historical and Quantitative Exploration," NBER Working Papers 20824, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
    3. Hefeker, Carsten & Zimmer, Blandine, 2011. "The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 595-606.
    4. Roman Horváth & Jakub Matějů, 2011. "How Are Inflation Targets Set?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 265-300, June.
    5. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    6. Aaron Mehrotra & James Yetman, 2014. "Financial inclusion and optimal monetary policy," BIS Working Papers 476, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Florin Cornel DUMITER, 2014. "Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 35-54.
    8. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    9. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2010. "Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 140-10, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    10. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Belke, Ansgar & Freytag, Andreas & Keil, Jonas & Schneider, Friedrich, 2014. "The credibility of monetary policy announcements: Empirical evidence for OECD countries since the 1960s," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 217-227.
    12. Athina Zervoyianni & Athanasios Anastasiou & Andreas Anastasiou, 2014. "Does central bank independence really matter? Re-assessing the role of the independence of monetary policy-makers in macroeconomic outcomes," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(4), pages 427-473.
    13. Berger, Wolfram & Kißmer, Friedrich, 2013. "Central bank independence and financial stability: A tale of perfect harmony?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 109-118.
    14. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
    15. Ansgar Belke & Andreas Freytag & Jonas Keil & Friedrich Schneider, 2012. "The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements – Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s," Ruhr Economic Papers 0355, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    16. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 2016. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint Una Vez Más: New Latin American evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 277-289, June.
    17. Uluc Aysun & Ryan Brady & Adam Honig, 2009. "Financial Frictions and Monetary Transmission Strength: A Cross-Country Analysis," Working papers 2009-24, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2010.
    18. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    19. repec:zbw:rwirep:0355 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Uluc Aysun & Ryan Brady & Adam Honig, 2011. "Financial Frictions and the Credit Channel of Monetary Transmission," Working Papers 2011-03, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
    21. Richard C.K. Burdekin & King Banaian & Mark Hallerberg & Pierre L. Siklos, 2011. "Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 3(4), pages 340-354, November.
    22. Dumiter Florin Cornel, 2012. "Empirical Approach Upon The Relationship Between Central Bank Independence And Inflation In Developed And Developing Countries," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 803-808, July.
    23. Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2010. "Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1003-1023, October.

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