Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule
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- Casella, A., 2000.
"Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions,"
00a02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Casella, Alessandra, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions," NBER Working Papers 8026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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KeywordsIncomplete Contracts; Integration; Legislative Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Games;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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