The President versus the State: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve
For politicians, appointments are an instrument of policy influence. By installing their representatives in an institution, politicians can count on policy influence for the duration of their appointees' terms. Given the stakes, the occasional controversy regarding nominees is understandable. On the whole, however, nominations are not controversial; in fact, Senate confirmation votes are often unanimous. Nevertheless, the Senate can have substantial influence in the appointment process. Using a formal model, this article examines how the president and Senate strategically bargain with one another within the confines of the Federal Reserve appointment process to influence monetary policy. With a new way to estimate monetary policy preferences, this article shows empirically that policy influence occurs via appointments. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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