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The President versus the State: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve

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  • Chang, Kelly H

Abstract

For politicians, appointments are an instrument of policy influence. By installing their representatives in an institution, politicians can count on policy influence for the duration of their appointees' terms. Given the stakes, the occasional controversy regarding nominees is understandable. On the whole, however, nominations are not controversial; in fact, Senate confirmation votes are often unanimous. Nevertheless, the Senate can have substantial influence in the appointment process. Using a formal model, this article examines how the president and Senate strategically bargain with one another within the confines of the Federal Reserve appointment process to influence monetary policy. With a new way to estimate monetary policy preferences, this article shows empirically that policy influence occurs via appointments. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang, Kelly H, 2001. "The President versus the State: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 319-355, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:17:y:2001:i:2:p:319-55
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    1. repec:kap:pubcho:v:174:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0491-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Mahieu, R.J. & Raes, L.B.D., 2015. "Hawks and Doves at the FOMC," Discussion Paper 2015-013, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. repec:bla:ecopol:v:29:y:2017:i:2:p:118-132 is not listed on IDEAS

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