A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History
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- Michael D. Bordo & Agnieszka Markiewicz & Lars Jonung, 2011. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History," NBER Working Papers 17380, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lars Jonung & Eoin Drea, 2009. "The euro: It can't happen, It's a bad idea, It won't last. US economists on the EMU, 1989-2002," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 395, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Jonas Fischer & Lars Jonung & Martin Larch, 2007.
"101 Proposals to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so many? A Survey,"
European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015
267, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Larch, Martin & Jonung, Lars & Fischer, Jonas, 2008. "101 proposals to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so many? A survey," MPRA Paper 20592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Buti & Daniele Franco, 2005. "Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3590.
- Hefeker, Carsten, 2001. "The agony of central power: Fiscal federalism in the German Reich," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(01), pages 119-142, April.
- Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005.
"Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments: Design and Impact,"
OECD Economics Department Working Papers
465, OECD Publishing.
- Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2018. "Fiscal rules for sub-central governments: Design and impact," OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism 01, OECD Publishing.
- V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003.
"On the desirability of fiscal constraints in a monetary union,"
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- V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2004. "On the Desirability of Fiscal Constraints in a Monetary Union," NBER Working Papers 10232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Paolera, Gerardo Della & Taylor, Alan M., 1999.
"Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime,"
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- Gerardo della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, 2000. "Economic Recovery from the Argentine Great Depression: Institutions, Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime," NBER Working Papers 6767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
- repec:ejw:journl:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:4-52 is not listed on IDEAS
- Sebastian Galiani & Daniel Heymann & Mariano Tommasi, 2003. "Great Expectations and Hard Times: The Argentine Convertibility Plan," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 109-160, January.
- Servaas Deroose & Sven Langedijk & Werner Roeger, 2004. "Reviewing adjustment dynamics in EMU: from overheating to overcooling," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 198, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
More about this item
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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