Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina
This paper examines the determinants of fiscal performance of sub-national governments in Argentina. This will be done through analysis and examination of the overall regime of incentives, through an analysis of salient episodes of `bailout` and through cross-sectional empirical analysis. The bailout episodes to be analyzed will include mostly those that occurred in the relationship between the national and provincial governments. Of primary interest will be the process that caused the crises and how both the provinces and the federal government reacted, with an emphasis on the incentives and constraints each faced. The paper will also try to explain the actual form that the bailout takes. The empirical analysis will emphasize those determinants of bailout related to the institutional design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions. Thus, the study will have direct implications regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the current institutional framework in generating sound fiscal behavior by the different levels of government.
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