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Public debt and changing inflation targets

Listed author(s):
  • Krause, Michael U.
  • Moyen, Stéphane

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor.

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File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/71902/1/742499790.pdf
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Paper provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre in its series Discussion Papers with number 06/2013.

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Date of creation: 2013
Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:062013
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