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Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy

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  • Melecky, Martin
  • Rodrıguez Palenzuela, Diego
  • Soderstrom, Ulf

Abstract

We quantify the effects of monetary policy transparency and credibility on macroeconomic volatility in an estimated model of the euro area economy. In our model, private agents are unable to distinguish between temporary shocks to the central bank’s monetary policy rule and persistent shifts in the inflation target, and therefore use optimal filtering techniques to construct estimates of the future monetary policy stance. We find that the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing the current level of the time-varying inflation target are reasonably small as long as private agents correctly understand the stochastic processes governing the inflation target and the temporary policy shock. If, on the other hand, private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, the overall gains of announcing the target can be substantial. We also show that the central bank to some extent can help private agents in their learning process by responding more aggressively to deviations of inflation from the target.

Suggested Citation

  • Melecky, Martin & Rodrıguez Palenzuela, Diego & Soderstrom, Ulf, 2008. "Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy," MPRA Paper 10545, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Fève & Julien Matheron & Jean-Guillaume Sahuc, 2010. "Disinflation Shocks in the Eurozone: A DSGE Perspective," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 289-323, March.
    2. Patrick Fève & Julien Matheron & Jean-Guillaume Sahuc, 2010. "Inflation Target Shocks and Monetary Policy Inertia in the Euro Area," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(547), pages 1100-1124, September.
    3. Michael U. Krause & Stéphane Moyen, 2016. "Public Debt and Changing Inflation Targets," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 142-176, October.
    4. Di Giorgio, Giorgio & Traficante, Guido, 2013. "The loss from uncertainty on policy targets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 175-182.
    5. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Bo Yang, 2012. "Imperfect Information, Optimal Monetary Policy and Informational Consistency," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1012, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    6. Del Negro, Marco & Eusepi, Stefano, 2011. "Fitting observed inflation expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 2105-2131.
    7. Aleš Melecký & Martin Melecký, 2012. "Vliv makroekonomických šoků na dynamiku vládního dluhu: jak robustní je fiskální pozice České republiky?
      [The Impact of Macroeconomic Shocks on the Government Debt Dynamics: How Robust is the Fisca      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(6), pages 723-742.
    8. Valdivia, Daney & Loayza, Lilian, 2010. "Adopción de metas de inflación y su impacto en las expectativas de inflación y volatilidad del crecimiento económico: evidencia empírica para Bolivia
      [Inflation targeting and its impact on the infl      ," MPRA Paper 37328, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Aug 2011.
    9. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2014. "Why is Inflation Targeting Successful?: Analysis of Inflation Target Transparency," EcoMod2014 6725, EcoMod.
    10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12493 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credibility; Transparency; Inflation targeting; Imperfect information; Private sector learning;

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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