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The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model

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Abstract

This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. For this purpose, two classical power indices that have their origin in solutions to co-operative games are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of the continuous accession process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out to the status quo rule ('one member, one vote') with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and to the representativeness of European monetary policy, along with the potential for its renationalization. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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  • Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2004. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 242/2004, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:hoh:hohdip:242
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    File URL: http://www.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/242.pdf
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    1. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    2. Dreyer, Jacob S & Schotter, Andrew, 1980. "Power Relationships in the International Monetary Fund: The Consequences of Quota Changes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(1), pages 97-106, February.
    3. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May.
    4. Ellen Meade, 2003. "A (critical) appraisal of the ECB’s voting reform," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(3), pages 129-131, May.
    5. Leech, D., 2001. "Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 587, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Helge Berger, 2002. "The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement," IMF Working Papers 02/175, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Ansgar Belke, 2003. "The rotation model is not sustainable," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(3), pages 119-124, May.
    8. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0175 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Belke, Ansgar, 2017. "Central bank communication: Managing expectations through the monetary dialogue," Ruhr Economic Papers 692, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:55:y:2017:i:6:p:1221-1238 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 49(4), pages 204-211, July.
    6. Ansgar Belke & Florian Verheyen, 2012. "Doomsday for the Euro Area: Causes, Variants and Consequences of Breakup," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, July.
    7. Ansgar Belke & Jens Klose, 2017. "Equilibrium Real Interest Rates and Secular Stagnation: An Empirical Analysis for Euro Area Member Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(6), pages 1221-1238, November.
    8. repec:zbw:rwirep:0477 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Honorata Sosnowska, 2013. "Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 1, pages 75-86.
    10. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    11. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 25-53, January.
    12. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 0175, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    13. Andrzej Torój, 2009. "Solving Forward-Looking Models of Cross-Country Adjustment within the Euro Area," Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics, CEJEME, vol. 1(3), pages 211-241, November.
    14. Honorata Sosnowska, 2014. "Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 75-88.
    15. Ansgar Belke, 2014. "Monetary Dialogue 2009-2014 – Looking Backward, Looking Forward," Ruhr Economic Papers 0477, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    16. repec:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:9-:d:132430 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Frey, Rainer, 2009. "The design of an asymmetric currency union with shock persistence and spillovers: Short-term versus medium-term," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 85-97, March.
    18. Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Stefan Napel & Matthias Weber, 2014. "Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-058/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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