Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-cdm/2004-02-29.html
Report NEP-CDM-2004-02-29
This is the archive for NEP-CDM, a report on new working papers in the area of Collective Decision-Making. Marco Novarese issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-CDM
The following items were announced in this report:
- Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 2004, "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4252, Feb.
- Sturm, Daniel & Smart, Michael, 2004, "Term Limits and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4272, Feb.
- Gradstein, Mark, 2004, "Inequality, Democracy and the Emergence of Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4187, Jan.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2004, "Speed and Quality of Collective Decision-Making, I: Imperfect Information Processing," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4179, Feb.
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2004, "Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters," Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 658612000000000083, Feb.
- Gradstein, Mark, 2004, "Political Bargaining in a Federation: Buchanan meets Coase," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4188, Jan.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 2004, "How do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4226, Feb.
- Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2003, "Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians with Multi-Task Problems," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 4075, Oct.