Electoral Competition with Imperfectly Informed Voters
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References listed on IDEAS
- Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007.
"Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
- John Duggan, 2003. "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000029, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:04:p:1231-1244_19 is not listed on IDEAS
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-02-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-02-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-02-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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