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Epistemic democracy with correlated voters

Author

Listed:
  • Marcus Pivato

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

Abstract

We develop a general theory of epistemic democracy in large societies, which subsumes the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Wisdom of Crowds, and other similar results. We show that a suitably chosen voting rule will converge to the correct answer in the large-population limit, even if there is significant correlation amongst voters, as long as the average correlation between voters becomes small as the population becomes large. Finally, we show that these hypotheses are consistent with models where voters are correlated via a social network, or through the DeGroot model of deliberation.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Pivato, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Post-Print hal-02980314, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02980314
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.06.001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Post-Print halshs-02431971, HAL.
    2. 'Alvaro Romaniega, 2021. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Papers 2108.00733, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    3. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2025. "Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(2), pages 603-655, March.
    4. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    5. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    6. Hendrik Siebe, 2024. "The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 475-507, November.
    7. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré & Rubén Montes, 2023. "Optimal Decision Rules for the Discursive Dilemma," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 889-923, August.
    8. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    9. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
    10. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré, 2022. "The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 863-895, May.
    11. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 213-257.
    12. Romaniega Sancho, Álvaro, 2022. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 41-55.
    13. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2016. "Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 72951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
    15. Pivato, Marcus, 2022. "Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    16. Pivato, Marcus & Soh, Arnold, 2020. "Weighted representative democracy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 52-63.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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