Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
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- Pivato, Marcus, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 51-69.
- Marcus Pivato, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Post-Print hal-02980314, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021.
"Deliberation and epistemic democracy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
- Huihui Ding & Marcus Pivato, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Post-Print hal-03637874, HAL.
- Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016.
"Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
- Marcus Pivato, 2014. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," THEMA Working Papers 2014-16, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
- Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2016.
"Jury Theorems,"
MPRA Paper
72951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Jury Theorems," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03443155, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2019. "Jury Theorems," Post-Print halshs-01970979, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2019. "Jury Theorems," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01970979, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Jury Theorems," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03443155, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2019. "Jury Theorems," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01970979, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Jury Theorems," Post-Print halshs-03443155, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022.
"Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
22011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22011r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Dec 2023.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2024. "Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03667931, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2024. "Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds," Post-Print halshs-03667931, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021.
"Social Epistemology,"
Post-Print
halshs-02431971, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02431971, HAL.
- Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02431971, HAL.
- Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré, 2022. "The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 863-895, May.
- Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2019.
"Majority rule in the absence of a majority,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 213-257.
- Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority," MPRA Paper 46721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- 'Alvaro Romaniega, 2021. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Papers 2108.00733, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
- Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022.
"Voter conformism and inefficient policies,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
- Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Post-Print hal-03799069, HAL.
- Aubert, Cécile & Ding, Huihui, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," TSE Working Papers 22-1308, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Romaniega Sancho, Álvaro, 2022. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 41-55.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2022.
"Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Marcus Pivato, 2022. "Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence," Post-Print hal-03637877, HAL.
- Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
- Pivato, Marcus & Soh, Arnold, 2020. "Weighted representative democracy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 52-63.
- Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré & Rubén Montes, 2023. "Optimal Decision Rules for the Discursive Dilemma," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 889-923, August.
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More about this item
Keywords
Condorcet Jury Theorem; Wisdom of Crowds; epistemic social choice; deliberation; social network; DeGroot.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2016-03-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2016-03-06 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2016-03-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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