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Epistemic democracy with correlated voters

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  • Pivato, Marcus

Abstract

We develop a general theory of epistemic democracy in large societies, which subsumes the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Wisdom of Crowds, and other similar results. We show that a suitably chosen voting rule will converge to the correct answer in the large-population limit, even if there is significant correlation amongst voters, as long as the average correlation between voters becomes small as the population becomes large. Finally, we show that these hypotheses are consistent with models where voters are correlated via a social network, or through the DeGroot model of deliberation.

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  • Pivato, Marcus, 2016. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," MPRA Paper 69546, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:69546
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    2. Joseph McMurray, 2017. "Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-Value Elections," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 108-140, November.
    3. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 431-458, August.
    4. Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2016. "Jury Theorems," MPRA Paper 72951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2022. "Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    6. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Post-Print halshs-02431971, HAL.
    7. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré, 2022. "The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 863-895, May.
    8. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 213-257.
    9. 'Alvaro Romaniega, 2021. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Papers 2108.00733, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    10. Cécile Aubert & Huihui Ding, 2022. "Voter conformism and inefficient policies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 207-249, July.
    11. Romaniega Sancho, Álvaro, 2022. "On the probability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 41-55.
    12. Pivato, Marcus, 2022. "Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    13. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
    14. Pivato, Marcus & Soh, Arnold, 2020. "Weighted representative democracy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 52-63.
    15. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré & Rubén Montes, 2023. "Optimal Decision Rules for the Discursive Dilemma," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 889-923, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet Jury Theorem; Wisdom of Crowds; epistemic social choice; deliberation; social network; DeGroot.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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