Monotonicity in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem with dependent voters
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References listed on IDEAS
- Berg, Sven & Paroush, Jacob, 1998. "Collective decision making in hierarchies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 233-244, May.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2002. "A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence," Economics Papers 2002-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Berg, Sven, 1993. "Condorcet's jury theorem revisited," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 437-446, August.
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- Malik Magdon-Ismail & Lirong Xia, 2018. "A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy," Papers 1807.06157, arXiv.org.
- David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2011. "Parliaments as Condorcet Juries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Representation of Majority Preferences," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2015. "When is voting optimal?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 341-356, October.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2014. "On the optimal composition of committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 973-980, December.
- Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2009. "On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case," Discussion Paper Series dp527, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi, 2011. "The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 435-443, September.
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2016.
"The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees,"
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- Ruth Ban-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2016. "The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees," CESifo Working Paper Series 5859, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2016. "The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees," IZA Discussion Papers 9875, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kaniovski, Serguei, 2009. "An invariance result for homogeneous juries with correlated votes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 213-222, March.
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- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Winston Koh & Shmuel Nitzan, 2012.
"Is specialization desirable in committee decision making?,"
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- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Winston Koh & Shmuel Nitzan, 2009. "Is Specialization Desirable in Committee Decision Making?," Working Papers 2009-16, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
- repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:51-69 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pivato, Marcus, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 51-69.
- Serguei Kaniovski & Alexander Zaigraev, 2011. "Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 439-459, October.
- Alexander Zaigraev & Serguei Kaniovski, 2012. "Bounds on the competence of a homogeneous jury," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(1), pages 89-112, January.
- Ingo Althöfer & Raphael Thiele, 2016. "A Condorcet jury theorem for couples," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 1-15, June.
- Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 91-125, June.
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