Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than [InlineMediaObject not available: see fulltext.] We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m≥3 is preferable to a random single expert. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (08)
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