Predicting Committee Action
Success of a policy often requires both that a good policy be adopted, and that the public or firms correctly anticipate what policy government will adopt. This paper models a relation between committee size and the effectiveness of policy, with a focus on how the accuracy of the public’s expectations varies with the size of the governmental committee setting policy. The paper also argues that the demand for access by special interest groups may arise not from a desire to influence policy, but from a desire to learn about government’s likely actions.
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