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Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information

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  • Rasmusen, Eric

Abstract

Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information against the benefit of being reelected. Lobbyists may possess private information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of verification. If the politician does not try to verify, however, the lobbyist has no incentive to be truthful. This is modeled as a game in which the lobbyist lobbies to show his conviction that the electorate is on his side. In equilibrium, sometimes the politician investigates, and sometimes the information is false. The lobbyists and the electorate benefit from the possibility of lobbying when the politician would otherwise vote in ignorance, but not when he would otherwise acquire his own information. The politician benefits in either case. Lobbying is most socially useful when the politician's investigation costs are high, when he is more certain of the electorate's views, and when the issue is less important. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Rasmusen, Eric, 1993. "Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 899-913, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:4:p:899-913
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dahm, Matthias & Dur, Robert & Glazerz, Amihai, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 2072/43869, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Christopher S. Cotton & Arnaud DĂ©llis, 2016. "Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 762-793.
    3. Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    4. Eric Rasmusen, 1996. "Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games," Game Theory and Information 9607004, EconWPA.
    5. Norbert Walter & Steffen Kern, 2011. "Politikberatung im EU-Finanzbinnenmarkt: vom Lamfalussy-Prozess zur europäischen Aufsicht," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(1), pages 91-105.
    6. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March.
    7. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.
    8. Mohtadi, Hamid & Roe, Terry, 1998. "Growth, lobbying and public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 453-473, August.
    9. Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2006. "How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset," Working Papers 050619, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    10. Pyne, Derek, 2006. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion: Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 21, pages 551-576.
    11. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
    12. Ashish Chaturvedi & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies," Working Papers 050614, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    13. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    14. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    15. Frank Fagan, 2013. "After the sunset: the residual effect of temporary legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 209-226, August.

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