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Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations

Author

Listed:
  • Ruth Ben-Yashar

    () (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

  • Jacob Paroush

    () (Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel)

Abstract

This paper derives optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations. Earlier studies focus on the dichotomous choice model and thus the present extension broadens the scope of applications of the theory of collective decision making.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruth Ben-Yashar & Jacob Paroush, 2001. "Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 737-746.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:737-746 Note: Received: 10 November 1999/Accepted: 13 April 2000
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    2. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
    3. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    4. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Pivato, 2013. "Voting rules as statistical estimators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
    2. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    3. Winston Koh, 2005. "The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 207-220.
    4. Bryan McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous Competence and a Limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Working Papers 16-12, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    5. repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:51-69 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    7. Pivato, Marcus, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 51-69.
    8. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers 2003-08, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    9. Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2006. "Information is important to Condorcet jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 305-319, June.

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