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Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Dietrich

    (CERSES - UMR 8137 - Centre de recherche sens, ethique, société - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Kai Spiekermann

    (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

It is often claimed that opinions are more likely to be correct if they are held independently by many individuals. But what does it mean to hold independent opinions? To clarify this condition, we distinguish four notions of probabilistic opinion independence. Which notion applies depends on environmental factors such as commonly perceived evidence, or, more formally, on the causal network in which people interact and form their opinions. In a general theorem, we identify conditions on this network that guarantee opinion independence in each sense. Our results have implications for 'wisdom of crowds' arguments, as we illustrate by providing old and new jury theorems.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2013. "Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00978016, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00978016
    DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzt074
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    Cited by:

    1. Hyoungsik Noh, 2023. "Conservativeness in jury decision-making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 151-172, July.
    2. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré, 2022. "The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(4), pages 863-895, May.
    3. Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Majority rule in the absence of a majority," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 213-257.
    4. Pivato, Marcus, 2017. "Epistemic democracy with correlated voters," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 51-69.
    5. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2014. "Probabilistic Opinion Pooling," MPRA Paper 54806, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Hendrik Siebe, 2024. "The interdependence of social deliberation and judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 475-507, November.
    7. Aureli Alabert & Mercè Farré & Rubén Montes, 2023. "Optimal Decision Rules for the Discursive Dilemma," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 889-923, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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