Elections and Market Provision of Information
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- Bruns, Christian, 2013. "Elections and Market Provision of Information," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79857, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Bruns, Christian & Himmler, Oliver, 2016.
"Mass media, instrumental information, and electoral accountability,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 75-84.
- Christian Bruns & Oliver Himmler, 2016. "Mass Media, Instrumental Information, and Electoral Accountability," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Bruns, Christian & Himmler, Oliver, 2014. "A Theory of Political Accountability and Journalism," MPRA Paper 59286, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
elections; information; media;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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