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Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections

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  • Oliveros, S

Abstract

We study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of different precision, with increased precision entailing an increasing marginal cost. In order to properly understand the incentives to collect information we introduce another dimension of heterogeneity: on top of the ideological dimension we allow for different levels of intensity in preferences. Contrary to traditional models of endogenous information, in equilibrium, there are voters collecting information of different qualities. After characterizing all symmetric Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies for arbitrary rules of election and fairly general distribution of types. We study information aggregation in symmetric electorates and show that information aggregates even when voters collect information of different qualities.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliveros, S, 2013. "Aggregation of endogenous information in large elections," Economics Discussion Papers 8984, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:8984
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    File URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8984/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
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    3. Martinelli, Cesar, 2006. "Would rational voters acquire costly information?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
    4. César Martinelli, 2007. "Rational ignorance and voting behavior," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(3), pages 315-335, February.
    5. Jerry Green, 1977. "The Non-existence of Informational Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 451-463.
    6. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:01:p:34-45_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
    9. Dubey, Pradeep & Geanakoplos, John & Shubik, Martin, 1987. "The revelation of information in strategic market games : A critique of rational expectations equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 105-137, April.
    10. Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward, 2002. "Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 421-452, December.
    11. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 460-501, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    2. Bruns, Christian, 2013. "Elections and Market Provision of Information," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79857, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Cesar Martinelli, 2011. "Ignorance and Naivete in Large Elections," Working Papers 1107, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    4. Matteo Triossiv, 2010. "Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin?," Documentos de Trabajo 267, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.

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