Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices
We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to provide this approach with foundations, it has become usual to show that competitive solutions are implementable, namely coincide with the strategic equilibria of an appropriate scenario (i.e. a game). This typically leads to models that involve a large number of agents’ replicas, where every individual agent becomes negligible. We specially analyse the effects of such constructions on the incentive compatibility constraints that are related with agents information transmission.
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|Date of creation:||01 Feb 1994|
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