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Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices

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  • Forges, Françoise

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE); Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Abstract

We survey some recent results on implementation of competitive solutions in differential economies. Extending to this context Arrow and Debreu’s definitions raises many conceptual issues. For instance, some properties of rational expectations equilibria may appear as paradoxical. In order to provide this approach with foundations, it has become usual to show that competitive solutions are implementable, namely coincide with the strategic equilibria of an appropriate scenario (i.e. a game). This typically leads to models that involve a large number of agents’ replicas, where every individual agent becomes negligible. We specially analyse the effects of such constructions on the incentive compatibility constraints that are related with agents information transmission.

Suggested Citation

  • Forges, Françoise, 1994. "Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1994007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1994007
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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