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Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics


  • Forges, F.
  • Heifetz, A.
  • Minelli, E.


If the allocation of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state - contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.

Suggested Citation

  • Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-06

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 552-567, August.
    2. João Correia-da-Silva, 2015. "Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 509-525, August.
    3. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2003. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 87-120, May.
    4. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-17.
    5. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
    6. M. Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," PIDE-Working Papers 2007:15, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    7. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    8. Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September.
    9. Hara, Chiaki, 2002. "The anonymous core of an exchange economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 91-116, September.
    10. Sun, Yeneng & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2007. "Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 131-155, October.
    11. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    12. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Joao Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Herves-Beloso, 2008. "General equilibrium with private state verification," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000024, David K. Levine.
    14. Anuj Bhowmik & Jiling Cao, 2017. "Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations," Papers 1703.08807,
    15. McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "Core convergence with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 58-78, January.

    More about this item


    GAME THEORY ; INFORMATION U.F.R. de science economiques; gestion; mathematiques et informatique; 200; avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 24p.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies


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