Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms
We model the trading possibilities of one seller and n potential buyers as a strategic game, which extends the two-person sealed-bid double auction. We introduce particular communication equilibria for this game, the self-fulfilling equilibria. In the case of arbitrary informational externalities, we show that self-fulfilling equilibria are euqivalent to veto-incentive compatible mechanisms.
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