Report NEP-GTH-2006-05-06
This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Laszlo A. Koczy issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-GTH
The following items were announced in this report:
- Martin J. Osborne, 2006. "Strategic and extensive games," Working Papers tecipa-231, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," Thema Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
- Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion," Thema Working Papers 2006-02, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Thema Working Papers 2005-04, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
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