IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_744_0529.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • Françoise Forges

Abstract

Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.

Suggested Citation

  • Françoise Forges, 2023. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 74(4), pages 529-539.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_744_0529
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_744_0529
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2023-4-page-529.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bayes rationality; information structure; strategic equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_744_0529. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.