The Principal-Agent Approach to Testing Experts
Recent literature on testing experts shows that it is often impossible to determine whether an expert knows the stochastic process that generates data. Despite this negative result, we show that there often exist contracts that allow a decision maker to attain the first-best payoff without learning the expert's type. This kind of full-surplus extraction is always possible in infinite-horizon models in which future payoffs are not discounted. If future payoffs are discounted (but the discount factor tends to 1), the possibility of full-surplus extraction depends on a constraint involving the forecasting technology. (JEL D82)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aej-micro|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eddie Dekel & Yossi Feinberg, 2006.
"Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 893-906.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"An Easier Way to Calibrate,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2059, David K. Levine.
- Vladimir Vovk & Glenn Shafer, 2005. "Good randomized sequential probability forecasting is always possible," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 67(5), pages 747-763.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "The reproducible properties of correct forecasts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 151-159, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:89-113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)or (Michael P. Albert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.