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Corporate strategy and information disclosure

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  • Daniel Ferreira
  • Marcelo Rezende

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  • Daniel Ferreira & Marcelo Rezende, 2007. "Corporate strategy and information disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 164-184, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:1:p:164-184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Van den Steen, 2005. "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 256-283, April.
    2. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 2001. "The Many Faces of Information Disclosure," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 1021-1057.
    3. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1995. "Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 1-25, February.
    4. C. Edward Fee, 2003. "Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1315-1357.
    5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. "Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
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    7. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
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    9. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    10. Kanodia, C & Bushman, R & Dickhaut, J, 1989. "Escalation Errors And The Sunk Cost Effect - An Explanation Based On Reputation And Information Asymmetries," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 59-77.
    11. Edward P. Lazear, 2009. "Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 914-940, October.
    12. Amir, Eli & Lev, Baruch, 1996. "Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: The wireless communications industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-3), pages 3-30, October.
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    14. Adam Brandenburger & Ben Polak, 1996. "When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 523-541, Autumn.
    15. Julio Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 2000. "Visionaries, Managers, and Strategic Direction," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 693-716, Winter.
    16. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    17. Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. "Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-1359, September.
    18. Phillip C. Stocken, 2000. "Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 359-374, Summer.
    19. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 1996. "Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1105-1134, December.
    20. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G., 2001. "Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 405-440, September.
    21. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
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