Learning by observing
We introduce a network formation model based on the idea that individuals engage in production (or decide to participate in an action) depending on the similar actions of the people they observe in a society. We differentiate from the classical models of participation by letting individuals to choose, non cooperatively, which agents to observe. Observing behavior of others is a costly activity but provides benefits in terms of reduction in cost of production for the observing agent, which we take it as learning. In this non cooperative setting we provide complete characterization of both Nash stable and socially efficient network configurations. We show that every society can admit a stable network. Moreover, typically there will be multiple stable configurations that will be available for a society. While all stable networks will not be efficient we show that every efficient network will be stable.
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- Vallée, Thomas & YIldIzoglu, Murat, 2009.
"Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 670-690, November.
- Thomas Vallée & Murat Yildizoğlu, 2009. "Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning," Post-Print hal-00722790, HAL.
- Thomas Vallée & Murat Yildizoglu, 2009. "Convergence in the Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Working Papers halshs-00368274, HAL.
- Thomas Vallée & Murat Yildizoglu, 2009. "Convergence in the Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Post-Print hal-00779035, HAL.
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- Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & Akiyama, Eizo, 2009. "Learning games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(10), pages 1739-1756, October.
- Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 1998. "Learning from Neighbours," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(3), pages 595-621. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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