Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games
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- Mattheos Protopapas & Francesco Battaglia & Elias Kosmatopoulo, 2008. "Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games," Working Papers 004, COMISEF.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Johannes Paha, 2010. "Simulation and Prosecution of a Cartel with Endogenous Cartel Formation," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201007, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
More about this item
KeywordsGenetic Algorithms; Cournot oligopoly; Evolutionary Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2009-05-30 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-05-30 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-05-30 (Game Theory)
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