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Fictitious play in coordination games

Author

Listed:
  • Aner Sela

    () (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O.B 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel)

  • Dorothea Herreiner

    () (Wirtschaftstheorie III, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other hand, players with unbounded recall are shown to coordinate (almost surely) against their own type as well as against players with bounded recall. In particular, this implies that a FP player's realized average utility is (almost surely) at least as large as his minmax payoff in 2þ2 coordination games.

Suggested Citation

  • Aner Sela & Dorothea Herreiner, 1999. "Fictitious play in coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 189-197.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:189-197
    Note: Received: December 1997/Final version: November 1998
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Huck Steffen & Sarin Rajiv, 2004. "Players With Limited Memory," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-27, September.
    2. Hoffmann, Eric, 2016. "On the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 349-362.
    3. Bryan McCannon, 2011. "Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 263-273, April.
    4. Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Models of Adaptive Learning in Game Theory," Chapters,in: Handbook of Knowledge and Economics, chapter 11 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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