IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Players with Limited Memory

  • Steffen Huck

    (Humboldt University)

  • Rajiv Sarin

    (Texas A & M University)

This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. In particular, the players do not know if they are playing a game. We show that players do better in games than in decision problems. This is because the players, unknowingly, improve the environment they face in games. We also show that people can do quite well in games even with severely limited memories, although memory restrictions tend to make them behave cautiously. Lastly, we introduce a solution concept approiate for analysis games in which the players may have limited knowledge of their environment and have some memory restictions. We show hos this solution concept is related to other like the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1645.pdf
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1645.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1645
Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
  3. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 1999. "Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 294-309, August.
  4. Lehrer Ehud, 1994. "Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 390-405, November.
  5. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
  6. Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers 4-97, Tel Aviv.
  7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  8. Sela, Aner & Dorothea K. Herreiner, . "Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 423, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Dec 1997.
  9. Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker & Amy Greenwald, 1998. "Learning in Networks Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations," Departmental Working Papers 199825, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  10. Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October.
  11. Rajiv Sethi, 1998. "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Game Theory and Information 9811003, EconWPA, revised 04 Mar 1999.
  12. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  13. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
  14. Sabourian, Hamid, 1998. "Repeated games with M-period bounded memory (pure strategies)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-35, August.
  15. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  16. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
  17. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
  18. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1993. "Case-Based Optimization," Discussion Papers 1039, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
  20. Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "A Memory-Based Model Of Bounded Rationality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 735-774, August.
  21. Dow, James, 1991. "Search Decisions with Limited Memory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 1-14, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1645. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.