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Players with Limited Memory


  • Steffen Huck

    (Humboldt University)

  • Rajiv Sarin

    (Texas A & M University)


This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. In particular, the players do not know if they are playing a game. We show that players do better in games than in decision problems. This is because the players, unknowingly, improve the environment they face in games. We also show that people can do quite well in games even with severely limited memories, although memory restrictions tend to make them behave cautiously. Lastly, we introduce a solution concept approiate for analysis games in which the players may have limited knowledge of their environment and have some memory restictions. We show hos this solution concept is related to other like the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Huck & Rajiv Sarin, 2000. "Players with Limited Memory," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1645, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1645

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yan Chen & Laura Razzolini & Theodore Turocy, 2007. "Congestion allocation for distributed networks: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 121-143, October.
    2. Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April.
    3. Katerina Sherstyuk & Nori Tarui & Melinda Podor Wengrin & Jay Viloria & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2014. "Other-regarding behavior under collective action," Working Papers 201404, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    4. Yilmaz Kocer, 2010. "Endogenous Learning with Bounded Memory," Working Papers 1290, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    5. Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2012. "Non-probabilistic decision making with memory constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 303-305.
    6. Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2005. "Non-Probabilistic Decision Making with Memory Constraints," MPRA Paper 2653, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2007.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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