Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
A model of the process by which players learn to play repeated coordination games is proposed with the goal of understanding the results of recent experiments. In those experiments, the dynamics of subjects' strategy choices and the resulting patterns of discrimination among equilibria varied systematically with the rule for determining payoffs and the size of the interacting groups in ways that are not adequately explained by available methods of analysis. The model suggests a possible explanation by showing how the dispersion of subjects' beliefs interacts with the learning process to determine the probability distribution of its dynamics and limiting outcome. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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- Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A., 1993.
"Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 205-222, April.
- Boylan, Richard T. & El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., 1990. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Working Papers 737, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- R. Boylan & E. El-Gamal, 2010. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 403, David K. Levine.
- Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
- John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
- J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
- Robles, Jack, 1997. "Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 180-193, July.
- Jeffrey S. Banks & Charles R. Plott & David P. Porter, 1988. "An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 301-322.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
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