Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study
This paper presents experimental evidence demonstrating that agents' knowledge of strategy alternatives in pure coordination games is inversely correlated with decision-making efficacy. Alternative theoretical accounts of players' choice processes in coordination games are considered to shed light on our empirical results.
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