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Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms

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  • Casajus, Andre

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  • Casajus, Andre, 2000. "Focal Points in Framed Strategic Forms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 263-291, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:32:y:2000:i:2:p:263-291
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bacharach, Michael & Bernasconi, Michele, 1997. "The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-45, April.
    2. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-550, May.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-595, May.
    4. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-673, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ɖura-Georg Granić & Johannes Kern, 2016. "Circulant games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 43-69, January.
    2. Fahrenberger, Theresa & Gersbach, Hans, 2010. "Minority voting and long-term decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 329-345, July.
    3. Alessandra Smerilli, 2012. "We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 539-560, October.
    4. Shurchkov, Olga, 2016. "Public announcements and coordination in dynamic global games: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 20-30.
    5. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2013. "Hidden symmetries and focal points," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 226-258.
    6. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Lee Chew Ging, 2004. "Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study," Occasional Papers 6, Nottingham University Business School.
    7. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March.
    8. Lisa Bruttel & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Make humans randomize," TWI Research Paper Series 83, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    9. Külpmann, Philipp & Khantadze, Davit, 2016. "Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 567, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 2006. "On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-040/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2006. "On the strategic use of focal points in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 622-634, October.
    12. Kuzmics, Christoph & Palfrey, Thomas & Rogers, Brian W., 2014. "Symmetric play in repeated allocation games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 25-67.
    13. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "The evolution of focal points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 21-42, April.
    14. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2005. "Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative," CEPR Discussion Papers 5067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Bruttel, Lisa & Friehe, Tim, 2015. "A note on making humans randomize," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 40-45.
    16. Tsuyoshi Hatori & Hayeong Jeong & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2014. "Regional learning and trust formation," Chapters,in: Knowledge, Innovation and Space, chapter 8, pages 180-212 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
    18. Marco Faillo & Alessandra Smerilli & Robert Sugden, 2016. "Can a single theory explain coordination? An experiment on alternative modes of reasoning and the conditions under which they are used," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    19. repec:eee:jeborg:v:140:y:2017:i:c:p:317-335 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Bacharach, Michael & Stahl, Dale O., 2000. "Variable-Frame Level-n Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 220-246, August.
    21. Zoe Bett & Anders Poulsen & Odile Poulsen, 2013. "How Salient is an Equal but Inefficient Outcome in a Coordination Situation? Some Experimental Evidence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 13-02-R, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    22. repec:uea:wcbess:13-02 is not listed on IDEAS

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