The Effect of Hysteresis on Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
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More about this item
KeywordsHysteresis; Minimum-effort Coordination Game; Logit Equilibrium; Experimental Economics; Equilibrium Selection;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2011-09-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-09-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-09-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-09-22 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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