The Role of Critical Mass in Establishing a Successful Network Market: An Experimental Investigation
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Note: LCERPA Working Paper No. 2015-10
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Pal, Rupayan & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2016.
"Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 266-269.
- Rupayan Pal & Marcella Scrimitore, 2016. "Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2016-010, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
- Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017.
"Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
- Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure," Working Papers halshs-01273429, HAL.
- Aidas Masiliunas, 2016. "Overcoming Coordination Failure in a Critical Mass Game: Strategic Motives and Action Disclosure," AMSE Working Papers 1609, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
- Aidas Masiliūnas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Post-Print hal-01681048, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
experimental economics; network goods; coordination game; critical mass;JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-05-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2015-05-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-NET-2015-05-16 (Network Economics)
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