# Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games

## Author

Listed:
• Crawford, Vincent P

## Abstract

A model of the process by which players learn to play repeated coordination games is proposed with the goal of understanding the results of recent experiments. In those experiments, the dynamics of subjects' strategy choices and the resulting patterns of discrimination among equilibria varied systematically with the rule for determining payoffs and the size of the interacting groups in ways that are not adequately explained by available methods of analysis. The model suggests a possible explanation by showing how the dispersion of subjects' beliefs interacts with the learning process to determine the probability distribution of its dynamics and limiting outcome. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.

## Suggested Citation

• Crawford, Vincent P, 1995. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 103-143, January.
• Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:1:p:103-43
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## References listed on IDEAS

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1. Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A., 1993. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 205-222, April.
2. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
3. Robles, Jack, 1997. "Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 180-193, July.
4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
5. Jeffrey S. Banks & Charles R. Plott & David P. Porter, 1988. "An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 301-322.
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