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Deadlines and Distractions

Author

Listed:
  • Saez-Marti, Maria

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

  • Sjögren, Anna

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

We analyze the effect of deadlines on timing of effort when agents are occasionaly distracted. We show that agents precautiously work early when completion of the task is uncertain, but rather likely. Agents who are rarely distracted will always postpone effort since the risk of not completing is small. As a result, increasing the probability of being distracted may even increase the likelihood of meeting the deadline. We further show that introducing the possibility of having the deadline extended may improve the total probability of completing the task without reducing the probability of completing within the originally announced deadline.

Suggested Citation

  • Saez-Marti, Maria & Sjögren, Anna, 2004. "Deadlines and Distractions," Working Paper Series 618, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 01 Jul 2004.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0618
    as

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    File URL: https://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/WP618.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2006. "Time of the essence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 252-272, July.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn, 2001. "Read this paper later: procrastination with time-consistent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 249-269, November.
    3. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007. "A theory of optimal deadlines," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 493-513, February.
    4. Fischer, Carolyn, 1999. "Read This Paper Even Later: Procrastination with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," RFF Working Paper Series dp-99-20, Resources for the Future.
    5. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Incentives for Procrastinators," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816.
    6. Sjögren, Anna & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2004. "On the Timing of Education," Working Paper Series 614, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Serena, 2018. "Successful Opaque Management," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-01_2, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    2. Kyle Hyndman & Alberto Bisin, 2022. "Procrastination, self-imposed deadlines and other commitment devices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 871-897, October.
    3. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2006. "Time of the essence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 252-272, July.
    4. Steffen Altmann & Christian Traxler & Philipp Weinschenk, 2017. "Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations," CESifo Working Paper Series 6761, CESifo.
    5. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2015. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113046, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Katolnik, Svetlana & Schöndube, Jens Robert, 2014. "Don't Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs: Strategic Delay in Project Completion," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-533, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    7. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deadlines; Timing of Effort; Optimal Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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