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Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation

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  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Torsvik, Gaute

Abstract

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  • Konrad, Kai A. & Torsvik, Gaute, 1997. "Dynamic incentives and term limits in bureaucracy regulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 261-279, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:261-279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    2. Dalen, Dag Morten, 1995. "Efficiency-improving investment and the ratchet effect," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1511-1522, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Government Debt-Threshold Contracts," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 444-458, January.
    2. Brezis, Elise S. & Weiss, Avi, 1997. "Conscientious regulation and post-regulatory employment restrictions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 517-536, September.
    3. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    4. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Kwang-ho Kim, 2013. "A Drawback of Political Accountability," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 405-428.
    6. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Mueller Hannes, 2015. "Insulation or Patronage: Political Institutions and Bureaucratic Efficiency," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(3), pages 961-996, July.

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