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Dynamic income taxation, redistribution, and the ratchet effect

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  • Dillen, Mats
  • Lundholm, Michael

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  • Dillen, Mats & Lundholm, Michael, 1996. "Dynamic income taxation, redistribution, and the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 69-93, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:59:y:1996:i:1:p:69-93
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    1. Xavier Freixas & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 173-191.
    2. Dixit, Avinash K & Sandmo, Angar, 1977. " Some Simplified Formulae for Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(4), pages 417-423.
    3. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1991. "Dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 15-35, February.
    4. Batina, Raymond G, 1991. " Equity and the Time Consistent Taxation of Income," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(3), pages 407-419.
    5. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
    6. Zou, L., 1991. "The target-incentive system vs. the price-incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect," Other publications TiSEM fd7efcb1-2cf3-42e0-b6a4-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Zou, Liang, 1991. "The target-incentive system vs. the price-incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 51-89, October.
    8. Blomquist, N Soren, 1981. " A Comparison of Tax Bases for a Personal Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 83(3), pages 390-407.
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    10. Feldstein, Martin, 1973. "On the optimal progressivity of the income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 357-376.
    11. Hellwig, Martin F., 1986. "The optimal linear income tax revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 163-179, November.
    12. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1987. "The optimal linear income tax : A diagrammatic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 379-390, December.
    13. ZOU, Liang, 1991. "The target-incentive system vs. the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect," LIDAM Reprints CORE 955, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. Eytan Sheshinski, 1972. "The Optimal Linear Income-tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 297-302.
    15. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1986. "An upper bound on optimal income taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 165-181, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcus Berliant & John O. Ledyard, 2014. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 196-221, April.
    2. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Union strategy and optimal direct taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 393-402, January.
    3. Kothenburger, Marko, 2007. "Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.
    4. Thum, Marcel, 2004. "Korruption," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 11/04, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. Craig Brett, 2012. "The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(6), pages 777-799, December.
    6. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    7. Konrad, Kai A., 1999. "Privacy, time consistent optimal labor income taxation and education policy," IZA Discussion Papers 82, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 427-443, March.
    9. Gerlinde Fellner & Magdalena Margreiter & Nuria Oses Eraso, 2003. "When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    10. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2019. "Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
    11. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    12. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2006. "Disability insurance and optimal income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(6), pages 717-732, November.
    13. Julie Ing, 2016. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 16/263, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    14. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1545, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Brett, Craig, 1998. "A note on nonlinear taxation in an overlapping generations model," MPRA Paper 8776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Ing, Julie, 2020. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    18. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    19. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0525, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    20. Finn Olesen, 2003. "Rudolf Christiani - en interessant rigsdagsmand?," Working Papers 44/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    21. Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Withers, John A., 2019. "Dynamic regulation revisited: Signal dampening, experimentation and the ratchet effect," DICE Discussion Papers 318, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    22. Oliver Lorz, 2004. "Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 25-41, February.
    23. Urs Steiner Brandt & Frank Jensen & Lars Gårn Hansen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004. "Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Contracting," Working Papers 58/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    24. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.

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