Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types
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- Jan Boone & Joel Shapiro, 2006. "Selling to consumers with endogenous types," Economics Working Papers 992, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Boone, Jan & Shapiro, Joel, 2006. "Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types," CEPR Discussion Papers 5862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations
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- Alessandro Bonatti, 2011. "Menu Pricing and Learning," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-163, August.
- Petal Jean Hackett, 2012. "Cutting too Close? Design Protection and Innovation in Fashion Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3716, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
endogenous types; experience goods; addictive goods; price discrimation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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