IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_3716.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cutting too Close? Design Protection and Innovation in Fashion Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Petal Jean Hackett

Abstract

Continued lobbying by high-end, American designers for intellectual property-type fashion design protection has culminated in the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, intended to introduce EU standards. Using a sequential, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework, we analyze the effects of protection on investment in innovative designs by high-quality (‘designer’) and lower-quality (‘mass-market’) firms when the mass-marketer may opt to imitate, consumers prefer trendsetting designs and firms compete in prices. We show that design protection, by transforming mass-marketers from imitators to innovators, may reduce both designer profits and welfare. The model provides possible explanations for the dearth of EU case law and the increase in designer/mass-marketer collaborations.

Suggested Citation

  • Petal Jean Hackett, 2012. "Cutting too Close? Design Protection and Innovation in Fashion Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3716, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3716
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3716.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1995. "Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 771-792, September.
    2. A. Buratto & G. Zaccour, 2009. "Coordination of Advertising Strategies in a Fashion Licensing Contract," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 31-53, July.
    3. Boone, Jan & Shapiro, Joel, 2006. "Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types," CEPR Discussion Papers 5862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Bourreau, Marc & Dogan, PInar, 2010. "Cooperation in product development and process R&D between competitors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 176-190, March.
    5. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 155-166, June.
    6. Jonathan M. Barnett & Gilles Grolleau & Sana El Harbi, 2010. "The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 159-200, January.
    7. Cowan, Robin & Cowan, William & Swann, Peter, 1997. "A model of demand with interactions among consumers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 711-732, October.
    8. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M. & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2007. "Explaining fashion cycles: Imitators chasing innovators in product space," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1535-1556, May.
    9. Baake, Pio & Boom, Anette, 2001. "Vertical product differentiation, network externalities, and compatibility decisions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 267-284, January.
    10. Ghazzai Hend & Lahmandi-Ayed Rim, 2009. "Vertical Differentiation, Social Networks and Compatibility Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, June.
    11. Insaf Bekir & Sana El Harbi & Gilles Grolleau, 2012. "The strategy of raising counterfeiters’ costs in luxury markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 645-661, June.
    12. Luca Lambertini & Raimondello Orsini, 2005. "Positional effects, product quality and regulation in duopoly," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 367-381.
    13. Frijters, Paul, 1998. "A model of fashions and status," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 501-517, October.
    14. Grilo, Isabel & Shy, Oz & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 2001. "Price competition when consumer behavior is characterized by conformity or vanity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 385-408, June.
    15. Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 55-71, October.
    16. Comino, Stefano & Manenti, Fabio M. & Nicolò, Antonio, 2011. "Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 388-401.
    17. Andrea Di Liddo & Steffen Jrgensen, 2006. "Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry," Quaderni DSEMS 06-2006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    18. Schmidt, Robert C., 2009. "Welfare in differentiated oligopolies with more than two firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 501-507, July.
    19. H. Leibenstein, 1950. "Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 64(2), pages 183-207.
    20. Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 381-409, Fall.
    21. Coelho, Philip R P & McClure, James E, 1993. "Toward an Economic Theory of Fashion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(4), pages 595-608, October.
    22. Boone, J. & Shapiro, J., 2006. "Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types," Other publications TiSEM 204f348b-5c07-415d-95a1-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    23. Veblen, Thorstein, 1899. "The Theory of the Leisure Class," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number veblen1899.
    24. Bagwell, Laurie Simon & Bernheim, B Douglas, 1996. "Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 349-373, June.
    25. Lambertini, Luca & Orsini, Raimondello, 2002. "Vertically Differentiated Monopoly with a Positional Good," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 151-163, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ghamat, Salar & Pun, Hubert & Critchley, Greg & Hou, Pengwen, 2021. "Using intellectual property agreements in the presence of supplier and third-party copycatting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 680-692.
    2. Appel, Gil & Libai, Barak & Muller, Eitan, 2018. "On the monetary impact of fashion design piracy," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 591-610.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefan Buehler & Daniel Halbheer, 2011. "Selling when Brand Image Matters," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(1), pages 102-118, March.
    2. Evdokia Dritsa & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2012. "Price Competition in a Duopoly Characterized by Positional Effects," Working Papers 12-21, NET Institute.
    3. George Deltas & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2018. "Product Proliferation and Pricing in a Market with Positional Effects," Working Papers 242312853, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    4. Ahmad Naimzada & Marina Pireddu, 2020. "A general equilibrium evolutionary model with two groups of agents, generating fashion cycle dynamics," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 43(1), pages 155-185, June.
    5. McClure, James & Kumcu, Erdogan, 2008. "Promotions and product pricing: Parsimony versus Veblenesque demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 105-117, January.
    6. Emanuela Randon, 2002. "L’analisi positiva dell’esternalità: rassegna della letteratura e nuovi spunti," Working Papers 58, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
    7. Luca Savorelli & Jacob Seifert, 2016. "Spatial competition and social welfare in the presence of non-monotonic network effects," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201615, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 06 Jun 2017.
    8. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Feichtinger, Gustav & Grass, Dieter & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M. & Seidl, Andrea, 2015. "Capital stock management during a recession that freezes credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-14.
    9. Goldbaum, David, 2021. "The origins of influence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 380-396.
    10. Kristen B. Cooper, 2017. "Consumer well-being in a future of accelerating novelty," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 315-335, April.
    11. Azamat Valei, 2017. "Informative Advertising in a Monopoly with Network Externalities," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp596, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    12. Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1999. "Segmented communication and fashionable behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 371-385, July.
    13. Robin Cowan & William Cowan & G.M. Peter Swann, 2004. "Waves in consumption with interdependence among consumers," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(1), pages 149-177, February.
    14. Dmitri Kuksov & Kangkang Wang, 2013. "A Model of the "It" Products in Fashion," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(1), pages 51-69, July.
    15. Kármen Kovács, 2015. "The Effects and Consequences of Simultaneously Arising Different Network Externalities on the Demand for Status Goods," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 375-396, July.
    16. Vishal V. Agrawal & Stylianos Kavadias & L. Beril Toktay, 2016. "The Limits of Planned Obsolescence for Conspicuous Durable Goods," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 216-226, May.
    17. Tobias Thomas, 2013. "What price makes a good a status good? Results from a mating game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 35-55, August.
    18. Hashimoto, Kaito & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2014. "A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 1-8.
    19. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M. & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2007. "Explaining fashion cycles: Imitators chasing innovators in product space," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1535-1556, May.
    20. Caulkins, J.P. & Feichtinger, G. & Grass, D. & Hartl, R.F. & Kort, P.M. & Seidl, A., 2011. "Optimal pricing of a conspicuous product during a recession that freezes capital markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 163-174, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    intellectual property rights; fashion design protection; imitation; licensing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3716. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.